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regulations for consideration and formal
approval by the Office of Administrative
Law concerning the statewide dispute
resolution program. The final set of proposed regulations developed pursuant to
the Dispute Resolution Programs Act
(Business and Professions Code section
465 et seq.) is expected to be submitted
in the next few months in final form.
(See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989)
p. 40 for background information.)
LEGISLATION:
AB 1770 (Roos), as amended May 9,
would prohibit a consumer credit report
or investigative consumer report from
containing the following information: (I)
the fact that a consumer was represented
or assisted by a legal aid, legal services
program, or other governmental source;
(2) the fact that a consumer was granted
a waiver of court or other fees. Currently
pending on the Assembly floor, this bill
would permit consumers to delegate to
any person pursuant to a power of attorney any right provided to consumer under the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies or the Investigative Consumer
Reporting Agencies Act.
AB 1523 (Hansen), as amended May
16, is pending in the Assembly Ways
and Means Committee. Existing law provides that funds of one board within the
DCA shall not be used to pay expenses
of any other board when it will interfere
with administrative duties imposed upon
such boards. This bill would provide
that those provisions shall not prohibit
monies from being transferred for a release time bank of any board, commission, or bureau pursuant to memorandum
of understanding.
AB 1272 (Eastin) would include
among the enumerated powers and duties
of the DCA Director the maintenance
of contact and liaison with the consumer
programs of each state agency. This bill
is pending in the Assembly Committee
on Governmental Efficiency and Consumer Protection.
AB 459 (Frizze/le), also pending in
the Assembly Committee on Governmental Efficiency and Consumer Protection,
would provide that any business license
issued by a licensing agency within the
DCA may be renewed at any time, regardless of length of delinquency, without
meeting reexamination requirements if
continuing education requirements have
been met and all applicable dues are paid.
AB 1578 (Murray) would authorize
a landlord to evict a tenant in unlawful
detainer proceedings for any controlled
substance violation on the rental premises, if the rental agreement prohibits
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violations of law on the rental premises.
Under the bill, the tenant would also
forfeit any security deposit to the landlord in such cases. This bill is pending in
the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
AB 1526 (Bentley) is pending in the
Assembly Committee on Public Safety.
Existing law requires employers of peace
officers in the state to establish a procedure to investigate citizen complaints
against their personnel and to make a
written description of the procedures
available to the public. This bill would
authorize those investigative procedures
to provide for the disclosure to the complainant as to the disposition of those
complaints.
AB 1729 (Chandler) is pending in
the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. Existing law provides that a board
regulating a business or profession may
deny, suspend, revoke, or restrict a license on the ground that an applicant
or licensee has subverted or attempted
to subvert any licensing examination.
This bill would make it a misdemeanor
for any person to subvert or attempt to
subvert any examination, in addition to
any disciplinary action that may be authorized. Such person would be held liable
for costs incurred by an agency in an
amount not to exceed $10,000 and for
the costs incurred for the prosecution,
in addition to any other penalties.
AB 1529 (Lancaster), DCA's omnibus legislation which would make numerous technical changes in statutory law
affecting specified DCA agencies, is pending in the Assembly Ways and Means
Committee.
SB 1078 (Dills) is pending in the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Existing
law provides that anyone who violates
provisions pertaining to unlawful, unfair,
or fraudulent business practices is liable
for civil penalties not to exceed $2,500
for each violation recovered in a civil
action. This bill would provide that a
penalty shall not be assessed against the
person if the person has paid fines or
penalties or has otherwise settled charges
pursuant to a violation of any other
civil or criminal law which is based on
the same underlying conduct constituting
the unfair competition.
The following is a status update of
bills discussed in detail in CRLR Vol. 9,
No. 2 (Spring 1989) at page 40:
AB 538 (Moore), as amended in
April, no longer applies to DCA. The
new version of the bill would require an
electric or gas corporation proposing to
establish a promotional rate, discount,
or rebate program for the purpose of
competing with another electric or gas
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corporation, or with a utility owned by
a local governmental entity, to first obtain authorization from the Public Utilities Commission. Provisions appearing
in the original version of the bill, which
would have required DCA to comply
with certain legislative reporting requirements regarding electronic commercial
services operations, were deleted.
SB 787 (Rosenthal), pertaining to
disclosure requirements in the sale of a
used car, is still pending in the Senate
Committee on Insurance, Claims and
Corporations. This bill would prohibit
the sale of a used car by a dealer unless
accompanied by an express written warranty covering the full costs of both
parts and labor necessary to repair any
defect that impairs the motor vehicle's
use or safety.
AB 552 (Moore), which would authorize the buyer of a motor vehicle, pursuant
to a conditional sales contract or purchase order, to cancel the agreement
within three days after signing the agreement, is still pending in the Assembly
Committee on Governmental Efficiency
and Consumer Protection.
AB 320 (Speier), which would permit
the buyer of a dating service or weight
loss contract to cancel the contract within
three business days after signing, passed
the Assembly and is pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
AB 718 (Frazee), which would expand the disclosure rights of consumers
who lease vehicles, passed the Assembly
on June 7 and is pending in the Senate
Judiciary Committee.

ASSEMBLY OFFICE
OF RESEARCH
Director: Steve Thompson
(916) 445-1638
Established in 1966, the Assembly
Office of Research (AOR) brings together
legislators, scholars, research experts and
interested parties from within and outside
the legislature to conduct extensive studies regarding problems facing the state.
Under the direction of the Assembly's
bipartisan Committee on Policy Research,
AOR investigates current state issues
and publishes reports which include longterm policy recommendations. Such investigative projects often result in legislative action, usually in the form of bills.
AOR also processes research requests
from Assemblymembers. Results of these
short-term research projects are confidential unless the requesting legislators authorize their release.
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MAJOR PROJECTS:
California Children, California Families is a series of publications undertaken
at the request of Assembly Speaker Willie
Brown, Jr. The series is designed to
heighten public and legislative awareness
of recent demographic trends and their
effects on families; establish a system
for tracking bills impacting families; and
spotlight trends and policies which are
adversely affecting families and which
need legislative attention.
In March 1989, AOR published the
first of the series, entitled More Than
Babysitting: Rethinking Childcare and
Preschool Policies. The report examines
the history of childcare development in
California and analyzes the current programs which cost the state one-half
billion dollars per year. Suggesting broad
approaches for reconciling conflicting
policies, the report discusses the need to
establish better priorities for the care
and education of young children and
includes -some specific recommendations
for implementing such policies.
The state of California supports more
than twenty childcare and education programs in five different departments.
These programs run the gamut from
daycare centers licensed by the Department of Social Services; Department of
Education-subsidized preschool and childcare programs; community childcare programs targeting specific populations;
programs which provide childcare to
families in need of welfare assistance;
programs which subsidize childcare for
welfare recipients in work or training
programs; and consumer and technical
assistance programs for parents and
caregivers.
The report criticizes the state for
having no coherent policy and no agreedupon set of priorities to govern state
spending for childcare. Citing studies
which demonstrate that low-income children who attend preschool programs tend
to be more successful in their later lives
than children who do not attend such
programs, the report states that only
25% of children aged three and four
who qualify for subsidized preschool programs are actually being served. Despite
the increased need for services and the
demonstrated success, in order to provide
half-day preschool programs to those
currently not served, it would cost approximately $591 million (almost $100
million more than the state currently
spends on all preschool and childcare
programs for children up to age fourteen).
For many California families, childcare is expensive and difficult to find.
Moreover, although the supply of licensed
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childcare spaces has grown substantially
over the past ten years, it remains in- ·
adequate to meet a growing demand,
especially of families with infants under
two years of age and school-aged children six to thirteen years old.
The report recommends several ways
to approach these problems while recognizing limited available resources. First,
it recommends that licensing regulations
be changed so that all childcare facilities
would be required to provide a preschool
curriculum. Second, it recommends a
vast expansion of the Department of
Education's part- and full-day preschool
programs, or in the alternative, that the
state encourage development of state/
local, public/private coalitions which can
share in the costs of providing and paying for childcare services to families.
Finally, the report urges that care and
education of California's young children
become a top priority for policymakers
at every level of government.
In April, AOR published the second
report of the series, entitled Foster Care:
Fraught With Data Gaps and Inadequate
Services. The prevailing belief underlying
both federal and state intervention to
dysfunctional families is that only under
extreme circumstances should a child be
removed from his/her home. The goals
of intervention are to prevent displacement from the home or return a child to
his/her home with the least destructive
intervention; and, if these are unsuccessful, to ultimately prevent multiple foster
home placement. However, a variety of
obstacles continues to undermine the
state's success in reducing the population
of children in out-of-home care.
Several kinds of foster care are available in California. The first is emergency
shelter care (initial, short-term placement
for children in dire need). The second is
the private family home, which may consist of county-licensed homes; certified
homes (under the jurisdiction of private,
licensed home-finding agencies); or residences of the child's relatives, which are
usually not licensed. Third is the group
home-a more structured, confined setting; and finally, the large institutionaltype setting.
The report selected eleven counties
for preliminary investigation, focusing
on the foster family home (county-licensed homes). The counties investigated
were Alameda, Amador, Calaveras, Contra Costa, El Dorado, Los Angeles,
Orange, Sacramento, San Diego, Santa
Clara, and Yolo.
The report centers on four principal
concerns: (I) the process of deciding to
remove a child from his/her home; (2)

the abuse of children in foster care; (3)
the growing interest in foster care "professionalization" and training; and (4)
the services available to children in foster
homes. The report also notes that the
data available to analyze foster care in
California are "abysmal" and "fundamentally limit the State Legislature's
ability to frame informed policy choices
for serious consideration."
The report identifies several problems
related to making the decision to remove
a child. The greatest pressure is the unavailability of early intervention programs to high-risk families. Although
these programs are costly, in the longrun, early intervention programs would
result in greater financial savings in the
child welfare system. In addition, there
are enormous pressures on individual
social workers who cannot do an adequate job with the huge caseloads they
are expected to carry.
With very few options available, once
the decision to remove a child has been
made, the sole criterion for placement
becomes the location of an empty bed.
As a result of these practices, many
foster placements unsurprisingly result
in failure. For instance, the emergency
shelter in Los Angeles uses 50% of its
beds for failed placements.
Analyzing data collected by the Foster
Care Information System (FCIS), the
AOR study notes that the most reported
reason for removing children from the
home statewide is the caretaker's absence
or incapacitation. The data system contains a specific code which defines absence or incapacitation very broadly as
"the absence of the caretaker due to
hospitalization, incarceration, or death;
incapacity of the caretaker to provide
adequate care for the child due to physical or emotional illness, disabling condition, or compulsive use of alcohol or
narcotics."
In its report, AOR is extremely critical
of the FCIS, stating it is confusing and
misleading. The data is to be used to
determine what services are needed and
in what priority, and to determine appropriate funding levels. However, using
the category described above as an example, policymakers will have no way
of knowing whether parents are dying at
alarming rates, being frequently incarcerated, or whether removal of children
statewide is attributable to an increase
in drug and alcohol addiction.
The report characterizes abuse in foster homes as a statewide problem. The
magnitude of the problem is currently
unknown due to the lack of formal documentation of charges and investigation
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of alleged abuse. Moreover, because of
the desperate need for foster homes,
there appears to be an increased tolerance for low levels of abuse if the offending person seeks treatment to correct
the problem.
Because of irregularities in the data,
AOR asked four counties to perform a
manual recheck of removals for alleged
abuse in foster care during the year
1987. In no case was the frequency of
alleged or substantiated abuse higher
than 3% in any of the four counties. The
report concludes, however, that because
the potential for underreporting is high,
a more systematic investigation is called
for, as well as the development of a
reliable method for obtaining information on the incidence of abuse in foster
homes.
While there is a growing consensus
in favor of mandated training for foster
parents, the report suggests that the mandate will prove useless unless it is enforced. More families will remain in the
system longer if they are better equipped
and prepared to cope with the especially
difficult children placed in foster care.
The report recommends that foster families be required to attend orientation
training sessions as well as ongoing training as a precondition to renewal of licensing. Further, AOR suggests that the entire family should attend the training
sessions and that they be paid a small
sum for the training.
In addition to the above, the report
also made the following recommendations: ( 1) the state should provide social
workers with more specific guidelines
for determining whether a child should
be removed from the home; (2) greater
efforts should be made to retain personnel, which could be accomplished by
reducing caseloads to a level which permits supervision consistent with safe, inhome treatment; (3) there should be a
wide range of early intervention services
available to high-risk families ( of children who receive in-home services, nine
out of ten remain in their homes); (4)
the state should provide direct assistance
to counties in addressing the dire need
for massive recruitment of new foster
parents; and (5) a thorough review of
data collection procedures should be
undertaken.
The Thrift Industry: History and
Background (April 1989). This report
describes the development of the savings
and loan industry. Formed in the Northeast during the early 1800s, cooperative
savings societies and mutual savings
banks were developed to finance home
mortgages and provide safe depositories
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for personal savings. These societies and
savings banks were the forerunners to
today's savings and loans institutions.
The S&L industry has played a major
role among the nation's financial institutions, especially during the building boom
of the 1920s. At the beginning of the
Depression, however, the industry was
governed by a hodgepodge of state regulations; by the end of the Depression,
S&Ls found themselves holding massive
amounts of repossessed devalued property. In 1933, 40% of the nation's $20
billion in home mortgage loans were in
default and more than I, 700 thrifts or
S&Ls failed.
Federal regulation of the S&L industry began in 1932 with the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act. This act authorized a
five-member board to establish and supervise a Federal Home Loan Bank System
consisting of twelve regional home loan
banks. Under the Act, all of the capital
stock of a district bank is owned by the
savings and loan associations served by
that bank. Each bank is a federallychartered, privately-owned corporation
subject to the policies and procedures
developed by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB).
During the S7 years since it was
enacted, the FHLB system has fulfilled
its original mission of providing loans
or "advances" to its member savings
and loans to ensure liquidity, thus making home financing widely available. The
bulk of the system's funding comes from
FHLB bonds and discount notes sold in
the public capital markets.
Due to the failure of S&Ls during
the Depression, Congress enacted the
National Housing Act of 1934, which
established the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to insure
accounts for up to $5,000 and to prevent
insured institutions from default. (In
1980, the coverage was raised to $100,000
per person per account.) The FSLIC's
operations were placed under the supervision of the FHLBB.
Between 1934 and 1979, it was necessary for the FSLIC to assist in the merger, sale, or liquidation of 124 S&Ls
nationwide. Of those, thirteen cases were
severe enough to require closure of the
S&L and insurance payments were made
to the insured depositors.
A strong economy from 1947 to 1960
contributed to· rapid growth in the S&L
industry. The use of national financial
transactions and the secondary mortgage
market were important trends which also
contributed to the industry's growth.
However, with increased competition,
higher interest rates, and declining earn-
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ings, the industry began to experience
problems in the 1960s.
In 1970, the Emergency Home Finance
Act established the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or "Freddie Mac"), which created an increased
supply of funds for housing by stimulating a secondary market for mortgages.
Inflation and a large increase in the
number of rules governing S&L lending
practices had a huge impact on the industry in the 1970s. In California, the biggest impact was the decision in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America that private
lenders in California could not use
"due-on-sale" clauses in loan agreements
to prevent purchasers of residential real
estate from assuming mortgages at lowinterest rates. Finally, in the late 1970s,
the FHLBB authorized S&Ls to institute
variable rate mortgages.
In the 1980s, stagnation in deposit
levels occurred because savers could get
a much higher return from money market
funds, stocks, savings accounts permitting limited checking, and other financial
instruments. As a result, hundreds of
S&Ls became insolvent or at risk of
becoming insolvent.
In response, Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980. The Act
eliminated interest rate lids that thrifts
could pay depositors, raised the deposit
insurance to $100,000, and allowed S&Ls
to reduce their capital to 4% of their
total assets. Despite the authority to
offer higher interest rates and adjustable
rate mortgages to attract new depositors,
many S&Ls were locked into thirty-year
fixed rate mortgages which were paying
the S&Ls lower interest than they were
having to pay their depositors. As a
result, between 1980 and 1983, almost
500 S&Ls failed across the country.
In 1982, Congress passed the GarnSt. Germain Depository Institutions Act,
which authorized a wider range of investments previously prohibited. In California, state-chartered S&Ls began to convert to federal charters in droves because
of the deregulation. Following the federal
action, the state eliminated most investment restrictions on state-chartered thrifts
in order to stem the tide of conversion.
In 1983, the authority to examine
California state-chartered S&Ls was turned over to the FHLBB and the FSLIC,
which then placed a moratorium on insurance for state-chartered thrifts in 1985
until the state regulators strengthened
the supervision of S&Ls.
According to the AOR report, the
new investment powers proved to be a
mixed blessing for S&Ls because of inex-
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perienced management. Between February
1984 and April 1987, 29 state-chartered
institutions and two federally-chartered
thrifts were placed into receivership by
the FHLBB. During the mid-1980s, California stiffened its regulatory control
over S&Ls.
At present, it is reported that there
are thirteen insolvent state institutions
and eleven insolvent federal institutions
in California. In the view of the president of the Federal Home Loan Bank of
San Francisco, the problems in the S&L
industry stem from " ... the present FSLIC
deposit insurance system which creates
incentives to engage in risk taking and
lacks the necessary market discipline to
control such activities .... "
Medication Risks Among the Elderly:
Cures, Cautions and Consequences (May
1989). This AOR report examines senior
citizen medication problems and the efforts in California to address them.
Nationally, an estimated 243,000 Americans were hospitalized by an adverse
drug reaction in 1985. In California,
hospital discharge records demonstrate
that 62% of reported adverse drug reactions to legally administered drugs
involved patients 60 years or older.
Researchers claim that 40-75% of the
elderly make mistakes in administering
their medication regimen. California hospital records reveal that seniors are most
likely to commit a medication error with
heart drugs or benzodiazepine-based tranquilizers. California is part of a growing
movement to educate senior citizens and
caregivers on the proper administration
of these drugs. Moreover, pharmaceutical
manufacturers are under increasing pressure to produce drugs which have been
thoroughly tested on elderly patients to
prevent illness or injury from adverse
reactions.
Studies indicate that the aging process
limits the body's ability to absorb, distribute, and release drug agents. Thus,
seniors suffer from drug reactions in
proportionately greater numbers than
other age groups. Yet, the AOR report
notes that most drug companies customarily secure FDA approval based on
clinical studies involving healthy, young
adults. Only 17 of the 200 most commonly prescribed drugs give geriatric dosage
instructions and, of the 24 most commonly prescribed drugs for seniors, only three
product labels mention geriatric adverse
reactions.
After documenting the risk of errors
in senior medication problems in the
first part of the report, the AOR study
recommends the establishment and maintenance of a substantial base of informa-
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tion on patterns of drug use and adverse
drug reactions among the elderly. At
present, there is an absence of data to
document the severity and extent of the
problem. Although more data is obviously needed, the AOR report includes a
review of current data available in California since 1986.
The second part of this report examines existing medication education programs in California. The report notes
that most education programs are supported by short-term grants, resulting in
programs which are highly fragmented
and tenuous.
In 1986, law was enacted to provide
that unused funds in the County Health
Services Fund could be directed to medication education programs for people
60 years of age and older for three years
(through fiscal year 1989-90). The AOR
study examined ten of the nineteen city
and county medication education programs which are partially funded through
this source, as well as other education
programs which do not use grant funds
for the purpose.
The AOR study concludes that an
accounting system is not in place to
assess the overall cost-effectiveness of
medication education efforts. According
to the report, there is currently no "hard
data" which demonstrate how many dollars were saved by activities which could
conclusively be credited for keeping someone out of the hospital.
AOR recommends paying close attention to the state's two-year, $1.3 million
drug utilization review program to evaluate the outcome of drugs prescribed for
Medi-Cal recipients. The review system
was required to be developed by the
state under the California Welfare and
Institutions Code and will begin a test
run in selected counties in July 1989.
AOR suggests that the data gathered
may show the extent to which medication
is prescribed or dispensed in error and
the impact education has on preventing
oversights. If after two years, intervention fails to produce a marked change in
drug errors, at least the state will then
know the difficulty in proving that medication education is cost-effective.
In its report, AOR makes the following specific recommendations to the legislature: (I) develop data programming
and support efforts to identify medication misuse patterns among the elderly;
(2) monitor Medi-Cal's two-year drug
review program to determine the costeffectiveness of educating physicians; (3)
support an expansion of the role of
pharmacists as medication managers for
the elderly (e.g., explore methods for

having pharmacists thoroughly explain
the use of a prescribed drug at point of
sale; (4) consider methods for increasing
a physician's knowledge of prescribing
geriatric medicine; (5) incorporate medication education efforts into the state's
preventive health care programs for the
elderly; and (6) develop statewide workshops and other means to promote an
exchange of ideas, materials, and knowledge among professionals who dispense
medication to the elderly.
Electricity Rates: San Diego Gas &
Electric and Southern California Edison
(April 1989). Requested by Assemblymember Lucy Killea, this AOR study
concludes that San Diegans would pay
less for energy under the proposed takeover of SDG&E by Southern California
Edison than if SDG&E remains independent. The report also found that a municipal takeover of SDG&E is a feasible
option, but additional study is needed.
The AOR study projects that San
Diego residential energy users would
have lower costs than they would without
a merger-3-11 % lower by 1993, and
14-21% lower by 1998. The lower rates
would be achieved in part by tapping
into Edison's power surplus and cutting
overhead.
However, the report found that the
effects of a merger are less clear with
respect to the impact on Edison's utility
rates. The report says that Edison's residential customer costs will be lower than
otherwise at first, but would then become
higher starting in about 1996. The reason
for the higher rates is that they will be
pulled upward by San Diego rates more
than they will be pulled downward from
merger savings.
The study projects that without a
merger, SDG&E rates will remain approximately the same as Edison's until about
1994. Then, from the late 1990s through
2007, it is projected that SDG&E rates
would exceed Edison's by about 17%.
The report determined that the rate increase would be attributable to major
urban growth and a dwindling supply of
cheap surplus electricity which would
eventually force the utility company to
build or acquire costly new sources of
power.
The study also projects that municipal takeover of SDG&E is feasible but
needs further study. The purchase price
of SDG&E was estimated to be between
$4.3 billion and $5.7 billion. The study
reports that taking reserves and other
costs of financing into consideration, a
bond act in the range of $4.8 billion to
$6.4 billion would be needed to finance
a municipal takeover. The actual price
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of such a takeover would be set by
negotiation, a court ruling, or the Public
Utilities Commission, according to the
study. Once the actual price of a municipal takeover could be established by
further study, accurate rate projections
could be established.
Completed in six weeks, the AOR
study has been criticized in the press
because the figures supplied to AOR for
its projections were provided by SDG&E,
and because the report fails to factor in
the availability of relatively cheap hydroelectric power if a municipal utility is
created.

SENATE OFFICE
OF RESEARCH
Director: Elisabeth Kersten
(916) 445-1727
Established and directed by the Senate Committee on Rules, the Senate
Office of Research (SOR) serves as the
bipartisan, strategic research and planning unit for the Senate. SOR produces
major policy reports, issue briefs, background information on legislation and,
occasionally, sponsors symposia and conferences.
Any Senator or Senate committee
may request SOR's research, briefing
and consulting services. Resulting reports
are not always released to the public.
MAJOR PROJECTS:
Report on the State's Regulation of
Financial Institutions (February 1989).
Produced by the Senate Advisory Commission on Cost Control in State Government (Advisory Commission) and submitted to the Senate Rules Committee
pursuant to SR 40 (Roberti, 1984), this
report is the third in a series of studies
undertaken to find ways to "increase
efficiency, reduce costs, enhance administrative accountability and control, and
apply improved program management
techniques and systems to state operations."
The substantial deregulation of the
financial services industry over the past
decade has invited abuse and mismanagement. Changes in the financial services
business have increased the competitive
pressure on banks and savings and loan
institutions (S&Ls).
An unprecedented number of banks
and S&Ls have failed over the past five
years. Even if not outright failing, 37%
of the state-chartered banks were in less
than satisfactory financial condition and
approximately 17% were in serious trouble
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in March 1988. Fraud was a factor in
approximately 33% of all bank failures.
Of the state-chartered S&Ls, 42% were
found to be "problem[s]" upon examination by the Department of Savings and
Loan (DSL) during fiscal year 1986-87.
During that same period, 30% of all
national failures of S&Ls occurred in
California alone. Fraud was a factor in
at least 80% of all S&L insolvencies
between January 1984 and June 1987.
The flood of institutional failures has
engendered monumental problems for
both the industry and the federal insurance funds.
Because of the potential for instability in our financial system and the need
to minimize the resulting adverse effects
on California, the Advisory Commission
concluded that the state must undertake
"an aggressive reform program aimed at
strengthening the supervisory abilities
of our financial regulatory agencies"that is, the Department of Banking and
the DSL.
The Department of Banking supervised 389 institutions and $265 billion in
assets in February 1988. The DSL supervised I 37 state-chartered S&Ls and
$147.9 billion in assets in December 1987.
The Banking Department recently adopted a "Strategic Plan '88" with "a sound
set of goals" for meeting its regulatory
objectives; the DSL has no such overall
strategy for its regulatory program. In
fact, the Advisory Commission found
that, in light of the industry's problems,
the DSL "had to operate under some
significant fiscal and operational constraints," including an inadequate number of examiners.
The profound changes that have taken
place in the industry have made state
supervision of its financial institutions
more important and more difficult. As a
result, the Advisory Commission believes
that an evaluation of the powers of banks
and S&Ls must be made. Then, based
on the interests of California citizens
and not industry preferences, the legislature must decide whether the present
laws should be changed.
The Advisory Commission made the
following recommendations:
(I) With regard to both departments:
-the legislature and the departments
must reevaluate the departments' existing
resources and ensure that they are adequate to supervise their respective licensees;
-the legislature and the departments
must create deterrents to and focus greater staff resources (including special fraud
units) on fraud and misconduct, which
are responsible for so many institutional
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failures;
-the departments must examine all
licensee institutions at least once per
year and "troubled" institutions every
six months;
-the departments must conduct a thorough review of their information sources
and negotiate greater access to federal
sources;
-the legislature and the departments
must provide salaries and benefits to
examiners and supervisory staff comparable to private sector equivalents; and
-the departments should overhaul
their human resources objectives by fully
implementing Department of Personnel
Administration (DPA) recommendations
regarding improvement of examiner salaries and benefits; requesting additional
authority from the DPA for filling and
reclassifying certain examiner classes;
and reassessing whether their career counseling programs are meeting the needs
of their employees.
(2) With regard to the Department
of Banking:
-the legislature should reinstate the
$100,000 appropriation cut from the
1988-89 budget to increase examiner
training.
(3) With regard to the Department
of Savings and Loan:
-the legislature should revise the Department's funding mechanism (currently,
assessments from the S&Ls it regulates)
by considering larger assessments; funding from the general fund instead; supplementing assessment proceeds by funds
from the general fund; or funding through
some other methods such as franchise
tax offsets;
-the legislature should shield the DSL
Commissioner from political pressures
by changing the office from a pleasure
appointment to a term appointment removable only for serious cause;
-the DSL must develop an operational
strategy analogous to the Banking Department's "Strategic Plan '88"; and
-the DSL should conduct joint examinations with the Federal Home Loan
Bank of San Francisco where it focuses
on operating areas unique to California
institutions.
The Advisory Commission also recommended against the consolidation of the
two departments into a single "Department of Financial Institutions" because
of the substantial differences between
the two regulatory structures and the
experiences of sister states.
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